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Who would have thought, three years ago,
that a loose electoral front in the form of
a Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD),
put together barely eight months ahead of
the run-up to the May 2005 national
elections, would cause the most contested
elections in the country’s political
history? Who could have imagined that cold
water would cool the excitement enjoyed by
the Revolutionary Democrats on the very next
day following the rally of hundreds of
thousands of their supporters at Meskel
Square in the first weekend of May 2005,
when a little over a million people swarmed
the same square to support their electoral
challengers, the CUD?
Who would have thought that the enthusiasm
and the subsequent turnout of voters in
Addis Abeba and elsewhere in the country
three years ago would re-ignite the
political passion of the citizenry? Or that
the massive votes granted to opposition
parties would shake the ruling party from
its core? Or even that the daring decision
by the Revolutionary Democrats to concede
defeat in Addis Abeba, where voters
penalized them for their neglect of the
capital during their first two terms and for
the mistakes they committed while
administrating it?
These surprises Prime Minister Meles Zenawi
reportedly described at the time as a “rude
awakening” for his party. Judging by the
latest events in the local and by-elections
held last week, and continued today, there
are more surprises in store than people are
prepared to admit.
Beyond emotional reactions, and indeed from
the perspective of a keen observer, last
week’s elections held across the country
(with the exception of the Somali Regional
State) and particularly in Addis Abeba, were
yet another bolt from the blue example of
the electorates’ power to choose who to put
in office.
True, last week’s and today’s elections were
a far cry from the hotly contested ones
three years ago. The campaigns by the
competing parties, some of whom decided to
jump off the wagon at the last minute, were
definitely below par, if not paternalistic.
Never mind the all too familiar top-down
preaching tactics used by the Revolutionary
Democrats as they give statistics and
progress reports. And none of these
campaigns were broadcast live, as the case
was in 2005, hence there was regrettably
little incentive for the electorate to fire
themselves up.
On the Election Day, April 13, at 11.00am,
there were no long queues of people waiting
to cast their vote - not even the whole day.
In fact, the capital looked more like a
ghost town, particularly in the afternoon as
a huge number of youth and Addis Abeba’s
elite chose instead to indulge in their
passion and watch the European Premier
League game between Arsenal and
Manchester. The large crowd at Meskel
Square had gathered not to show support or
allegiance to a party as in May 2005, but
rather to follow the soccer match from the
mega Sony Screen where the game was being
transmitted. Miniature crowds also converged
in the various restaurants and kiosks across
the capital to watch the same match.
Scouting through these various outlets in
the capital on Sunday and on the following
days to find out the number of people who
had actually voted - for whatever contesting
party - was a kind of daunting task. Many of
those who stayed away from polling stations
and refused to ink their fingers claimed to
have given up on the idea that electoral
gambles could bring about a change of
government. Yet others still were frustrated
by the nasty feud within the opposition
bloc, thus expressed dismay at the apparent
lack of choice on who to elect into power.
These misgivings nevertheless overshadow
interesting revelations by the keen observer
on the figures on the electorate: In Addis
Abeba, about 200,000 more people had
registered for these elections than for the
highly contested ones held in 2005. On a
national level, close to one third of the
electorate had registered now, adding half a
million more people to the voter’s roll of
25.5 million three years ago. The number of
polling stations was increased to 42,000 -
up from the 33,000 prepared then - thus
costing the federal government 100 million
Br.
These elections, marred by allegations of
intimidations and subsequent boycotts by
opposition parties such as the United
Ethiopian Democratic Front (UEDF) and Oromo
Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM), has
results due in a few weeks, which will be
released by the National Electoral Board of
Ethiopia (NEBE), the only authoritative
source for data on electoral information.
Preliminary results pasted on the walls on
polling stations on the following days
suggest, however, that the Revolutionary
Democrats have enjoyed a landslide victory
in Addis Abeba, recovering from their
electoral wounds a few years ago. The
earlier overwhelming rejection of the
Revolutionary Democrats by Addis Abebans was
what they finally and rightly described as
“protest votes” as opposed to endorsement of
opposition policies over theirs.
Whether or not their opponents admit it,
Revolutionary Democrats have numbers they
could feel good about. Take, for instance,
voters in Merkato, the epicentre of
resistance in the aftermath of May 2005
elections: 4032 people cast their votes for
them in Kebelle 27 of Addis Ketema District
as compared to the 351 votes Ayele Chamiso’s
CUD got. In Kebelle 16/17 of the same
District, 2301 voters showed their
allegiance to the EPRDF, in sharp contrast
to the 256 votes cast for the CUD. These are
far from isolated and anecdotal cases.
Judging from these preliminary results, it
becomes obvious that the 14 vacant positions
in parliament that CUD candidates declined
to take three years ago will be filled by
candidates fielded by EPRDF. None of the
independent candidates were popular enough
to sway, such as Ashebir W. Giorgis (MD),
the most embattled football official, or
Molla Zegeye, a lawyer jailed for many years
after being accused of involvement in
atrocities committed by the military regime
whose officials he later on defended in a
court of law; none were popular enough to
sway votes from the incumbent.
That the Revolutionary Democrats would sweep
these elections was obvious. They had
started to work on it immediately after
their electoral embarrassment in a manner
that was well designed and orchestrated,
while their political rivals immersed
themselves in a bitter internal struggle to
the confusion and utter frustration of their
supporters here and abroad. The
Revolutionary Democrats have good reasons to
believe that their efforts to neutralise
urban protests, due to series of public
consultations from teachers to youth to
residents, if not the instructors and
professors of the academia, has paid
electoral dividends.
Indeed, these were not elections about
fierce contests among political parties, for
many of the opponents of the Revolutionary
Democrats knew all too well that they were
just in the race to participate. One of the
electoral games the incumbent played was to
recruit, earlier on, as many members as it
could so that it would have the logistical
ability to dispatch them to the electoral
battle. That each regional council decided
to have local administrative units, each
having 100 elected kebelle officials, as
opposed to 15 in the past, did much to work
against the opposition. Even combined, they
were not able to match the all mighty EPRDF
as they fielded a total of 100,000
candidates in sharp contrast to over 3.7
million runners on the Revolutionary
Democrat’s platform.
This is certainly a logistical nightmare for
any party without having the advantage of
being an incumbent, if not a drain on their
financial resources. If the EPRDF were to
pay 100 Br to each of its candidate for
transport allowance during the campaign, it
would spend over 350 million Br for the
nearly 400 million candidates it has got
elected. Which opposition party in Ethiopia
can go that deep into its pocket? It seems
that the Revolutionary Democrats have learnt
one or two lessons from their electoral
defeat a few years ago, and a few more from
the United States where the re-demarcation
of electoral boundaries has a lot to do in
determining who should be in the White
House.
Far from the electoral battle waged by the
political parties, the biggest surprise is
the increase in voter turnout, as disclosed
by the Electoral Board; over 90pc of those
registered to vote have indeed cast their
votes at a national level, while this figure
for the capital is over 80pc. Sample visits
conducted by reporters from this newspaper
in Addis Abeba, Adama (Nazareth) and Awassa
confirm this claim as each of the kebelles
that they sampled had a turnout of between
70pc to 80pc.
This in itself is a big statement; who would
have thought that a capital that bitterly
rejected a political party would have shown
such level of turn out only after three
years? Whether or not there were choices,
why didn’t voters demonstrate their protest
- if they still are protesting - by shunning
away from polling stations? Shouldn’t voters
display their displeasure with the EPRDF -
if they are displeased - not only by voting
for another party but also by boycotting it;
and embarass its leaders? Are voters sending
a signal that their confidence in the
electoral process has been restored?
Well, the electorate voted for various
reasons, and many are the reasons for those
who did not. Some said they voted for the
incumbent out of a lack of choice, while
others claim that they had now voted for
their own interests, unlike in the past
where they made their decisions on the basis
of their emotions. Understandably, the
Revolutionary Democrats worked hard and
invested so much to grab these votes by
appealing to voters to consider their track
record in attempting to fulfil the
provisions that people are desperately
in-need: housing, employment, good services,
infrastructural expansion, and business
opportunities for small businesses. If
indeed voters believed them, and that would
be part of the reasons why they tuned out to
vote, albeit in quiet manner, this, in
itself, is a major victory for the
Revolutionary Democrats.
It is up to them to use Ethiopia’s unending
surprises wisely and not ruin it once again
as they have done several times in the
past. |