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I would have preferred it if I were not once again
responding to Liku Damtew’s (PhD) views published in
this newspaper last week. I decided, however, to
clarify some legal issues as I believe that it is to
the best interest of your esteemed readers.
In his commentary headlined: “Stop Daylight Robbery
of Consumers” [Volume 8, Number 413, March 30,
2008], Liku proposed the indirect intervention of
the Ethiopian state by enacting a law on consumers’
protection and on unfair trade practices between
consumers’ proper (as if there are consumers’
improper) and firms as sellers.
Reiterating the Prime Minister’s advice on forming
consumer associations along the Edier and
Eqube models as a solution to controlling market
dysfunctions, Liku argues that “just because the
Edier and Eqube models are popular in
this country does not mean that a consumer
cooperative should be modeled in their format.”
After considering the fact that Liku is a lawyer, I
could not help but express my views in this
newspaper in an article headlined, “Emulation of
Edier and Eqube not the Best for
Consumers Cooperatives,” [Volume 8 Number 414, April
6, 2008].
I still firmly believe that the establishment and
purpose of Edier and Eqube have
nothing to do with controlling prices or with
helping to resolve market crises and that the legal
framework governing Edier is different from
that on consumer associations. Edier and
Eqube also suffer legal shortcomings which
hinder them from being integrated partly, if not
entirely, into the country’s legal system. One can
not, therefore, expect them to set models for other
groupings. Contrary to Liku’s suggestion otherwise,
there exists a Cooperative Societies’ Proclamation,
issued in 1998, which is the legislative foundation
for the formation of consumer associations.
Although the legal framework governing Edier
falls under the rules of associations of the
Ethiopian Civil Code, again, in sharp contrast to
what Liku’s argument suggests, the code clearly and
emphatically excludes “cooperatives - including
consumers’ cooperatives - and other groupings which
tend to satisfy the financial interests of their
members by placing them in a position to save money”
in its application.
Thus, the non-applicability of the Civil Code
provisions to consumer cooperatives is not merely a
matter of their incompatibility with some of the
rules of the code, as Liku argues, but a problem of
the virtual inappropriateness of the code to
businesses like cooperative groupings.
Liku also maintains that I fell short of grasping
his supposed earlier argument on the enactment of a
legislation that provides “matters of trade
restraint, cartels, collusions…” which are not dealt
with or available in the proclamation I was
referring to, that is, “cooperative societies’
proclamation.” In his previous article, Liku
“submitted” that the government must provide some
framework by issuing a consumer protection policy
and a regulatory direction, the existence of which
he categorically denied. Without specifically
commenting on what I wrote pertaining to the
presence of a proclamation for the formation of
consumer cooperatives, he tried to make a subtle yet
unsuccessful shift to arguments on the non-existence
of a law that I neither discussed nor mentioned as
having any relation to the formation of consumer
cooperatives or other forms of groupings.
I am very well aware of a proclamation issued in
2003 governing trade practices, which provides a
host of provisions, among other issues, which
regulate prices and the equitable distribution of
certain basic goods and services in times of
irregular and inadequate supplies. These provisions
are necessary in order to safeguard the public. This
law also seeks to establish a system that is
conducive for the promotion of a competitive
environment by regulating anti-competitive practices
in order to maximize economic efficiency and social
welfare. This proclamation may be described as the
single major law on consumers’ protection and unfair
trade practices, although it is by no means the only
one since laws on consumer protection, under our
legal system, are highlighted in various
legislations.
What Liku considers a “novel idea” and perhaps
“unknown” distinction between consumer associations
“that deal with bread and butter issues” and “the
second ones that fight on issues of quality of life
concerns”, are interestingly put without explaining
the laws applicable to governing and regulating each
association. Obviously, the former are governed by
the aforementioned cooperative societies’
proclamation and the latter are regulated by the
rules of association under the Ethiopian Civil Code.
In the absence of such an understanding of the
series of Ethiopian laws, countless examples may be
cited of misguided legal advice provided by a new
breed of lawyers from both the previous and current
generations. It is important, however, to understand
that whenever a given state task is ordered for the
accomplishment of certain activities, it has been
customary to come up with “new” legislations, from
those already in existence but which simply have
despicably been forgotten or ignored. The law on the
lease of urban land and the law on condominiums are
the most notorious examples of this.
The Urban Land Lease Law and that on condominiums
are legal concepts that are sufficiently dealt with
under the Ethiopian Civil Code. Leasing and
sub-leasing of private and government houses is yet
another very disappointing example.
A decade ago, the Addis Abeba City Administration,
which was known then as the Region 14
Administration, tragically nullified and terminated
through administrative order, the legal relationship
established between the lessee and sub-lessee of
government occupied houses. It deemed the latter
illegal and not supported by any law notwithstanding
a valid and enforceable law under the Ethiopian
Civil Code, Article 2957-2964) and the Co-dwelling
Regulations No. 94/1986 that were promulgated under
the military government.
In those days, the Region 14 Administration decided
to sever its lease contract with lessees because of
the alleged illegality or absence of a law that
allowed it; and it entered into new lease contracts
with sub-lessees, a move that precipitated an
outrageous attack on the sanctity and legality of
the contracts. We all know the harsh consequences of
this action, particularly among the peaceful
residents of the confiscated houses.
In fact, among some lawyers, such measures may be
justified by invoking droit du seigneur - the
supposed legal or customary right of a feudal lord
to do what he wishes. However, this arbitrary right
is not granted to the current Ethiopian government
whose exercise of state power is strictly and
meticulously governed and regulated by the
constitution and other laws.
I hope the foregoing explanations will not be a
mysterious riddle or as enigmatic for Liku as the
1930s major European powers appeasement policy
towards Nazi Germany and more particularly, as the
1938 Munich Pact was for Sir Winston Churchill.
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