In the past, famine has been a major factor in overthrowing governments, so the current regime has focused on these crises to avoid the unrest that saw the end of its predecessors. This has distracted attention from addressing the underlying causes of famine: rural destitution, the lack of employment options and the impact of the international economy (for example, the collapse in coffee prices).

There is little agreement about how to address long-term causes of famine; emergency food aid remains the primary response by the government and donors. In the highlands of Ethiopia, the risk of famine is recognised and early warning systems (EWS) are now in place to track food availability and rainfall.

In other areas, recurrent crises have reduced pastoralists' ability to cope, as they have become destitute and no longer have reserves to deal with bad years. Pastoralists are traditionally more resilient to drought than other groups, because their way of life is better adapted to coping.

Donors have also focused on providing food aid during acute crises, with less attention on longer-term development efforts. Furthermore, pastoralists and other minority groups have little political influence: areas of strong government support have received more attention and assistance.

Comparing the crises of 1999-2000 and 2002-2003, reveals: Early Warning Systems were introduced after the 2000 famine and worked quickly in 2002. However, experts underestimated the scale of the crisis and these systems did not provide important information for pastoral areas.

In both famines, there was a limited response beyond food aid. For example, there was a lack of emergency healthcare and water. This reduced the effectiveness of food aid, while the response in 1999 was slow. Donors did not want to support the Ethiopian government because of its war with Eritrea.

In 2002, though, the response was faster, largely due to quick food aid from the United States. By 2002, however, Ethiopia had become strategically important as a regional American ally on 'war against terror'.

While donors have committed to supporting short-term relief programmes during crises, there is little funding for rural development so that people can become self-sufficient again. The underlying causes of famine, and the political marginalisation of vulnerable groups, are not being addressed by donors or the government.

The lessons from the two recent famines show that: Donors and government need to reach consensus on famine strategies, which includes a humanitarian response and addresses underlying factors; policymakers need to monitor health problems alongside food security, and famine responses must provide healthcare and water supply as well as food.

During the recent famines, decentralised food distribution centres avoided large-scale displacement to feeding camps. However, without similar decentralised healthcare centres (and other services), there are considerable risks for people deciding to stay put in times of crisis.