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In September 2002, negotiations on Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were launched with the
European Union (EU) amidst much understandable
anxiety and apprehension on the part of the African,
Caribbean and Pacific group of states (ACP).
Suddenly, the very foundations on which the ACP had
built privileged trade relations with the EU shook
to the point of collapse. Right from the word "go",
the negotiations were skewed in Europe's favour.
Nevertheless, true to its way of doing things, the
ACP did not dedicate enough time or thought to
create viable alternatives to the Cotonou Agreement
for these two grossly unequal cohorts.
The ACP, as far as one can remember, has always
merely reacted to plans put forth by its 'partner',
rather than giving suggestions of its own. The
concept of EPAs is a fine example of the ACP
following the path designed and desired by the EU.
But the worst had yet to come.
The EU knew from the outset that unity and
solidarity were futile words as far as the ACP was
concerned and that it would not be too difficult to
have the group sit at the negotiating table as
broken components. Even the "A" of the ACP was
sub-divided into four distinct negotiating clusters.
Needless to say, the ACP is largely responsible for
the divisive nature of its negotiating make-up. For
example, some members of the Western and Central
African groups in Brussels allowed themselves to be
convinced that they could do it separately and that,
indeed, negotiating as discrete entities would be
more advantageous than as a single group. As the
then Economic Commissioner of the African Union
(AU), I tried in vain to reason with ambassadors in
Brussels and persuade them of the dire need for
African countries to present a common front, rather
than negotiate as four distinct sub-regional groups.
Much to my chagrin, they remained adamant that
branching out was the only way forward, despite a
decision by the Assembly of African Union Heads of
State and Government for the African Group to
negotiate as one.
For five years the 'negotiations' have continued
with little to show in terms of progress. That is
until now, as pressure mounts in the ACP regions to
conclude these negotiations before the December 31
deadline. With a clear absence of shared purpose, a
lack of coordination at all levels and
procrastination to boot, one should hardly wonder
why those African countries which signed the Cotonou
Agreement find themselves in such a tight spot.
What is it that can be achieved in the final few
weeks of 2007, which could not be accomplished in
five years of talks?
According to EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson
the ACP has room for manoeuver.
"This deadline is not a bluff or some negotiating
tactic invented in Brussels. It is an external
reality created in the WTO in Geneva. We have given
a binding multilateral commitment that was set and
agreed seven years ago," Mandelson recently warned.
At stake is the question of the livelihood and
well-being of millions of people - the vast majority
of whom live on less than a dollar a day. It is a
question of millions of people for whom the EU and
the international community have set Millennium
Development Goals, one of which is halving poverty
levels by 2015. How does one reconcile this lofty
objective with Mandelson's threat that "he has no
hat and no rabbit to pull out of it"? So, is it do
or die?
No agreement is better than a bad agreement, and at
this point, the only way forward is political. The
ACP would do well to avoid shifting or breaking
configurations at the eleventh hour. If anything,
these countries should adopt the political track and
join with other like-minded countries to push for an
all ACP Summit to address the outstanding issues. To
start with, the ACP should convene an extraordinary
session at the highest level and decide not to sign
the agreements.
They should also push for a political solution -
including the possibility of having the Cotonou
regime extended as a transitional measure pending
agreement on alternative trading arrangements. The
ACP should then do one of two things: they should
join with the EU to negotiate an extension of the
WTO waiver for a minimum of one year. During that
period, both parties should seriously explore
alternative arrangements for a trade relationship,
with the understanding that the EU would not place
on the negotiating table issues which the ACP
countries - under the umbrella of the G90 - have
collectively and unanimously rejected at the WTO.
Or, with the help of the EU and other developing
countries, the ACP should address the existing
imbalances in WTO rules and change them to be more
developing-country friendly.
The EU would probably reject both these options -
especially the second. But adopting the first option
is a genuinely viable political alternative to
signing the EPAs. It is purely a question of
political will and a sincere partnership.
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