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Ethiopia's continual existence as a state for
thousands of years is in part a result of the fact
that successive rulers have established foreign
policies that reflect their own sense of statehood.
In turn, it is partly because of the consistent
conduct of foreign policy that the world has come to
know and respect from Ethiopia; hence our nation's
existence is recognised and respected.
Almost 1,500 years ago, the Ethiopian monarch
granted asylum to the companions of the Prophet
Mohammed who were escaping persecution in Arabia and
seeking asylum in our country. The emperor received
the emissaries of the Arab tribes opposed to the
first Muslims but rejected their demands for the
forced return of the refugees. As well as an act of
mercy, this was an exercise in sovereign power, and
also the reflection of Ethiopia's foreign policy.
Just 60 years ago, after the Second World War and
the restoration of Ethiopia's sovereignty, Emperor
Haile Selassie, who had been a refugee himself,
immediately recognised that the solidity and even
continued existence of the Ethiopian state depended
upon its foreign policy. He devoted immense
attention and energy to foreign relations and
established the most sophisticated foreign policy of
any state in the region, beginning with enthusiastic
membership of the United Nations (UN). Ethiopia was
among the very first signatories of a host of
international covenants, including, for example, the
Genocide Convention, which was not only
expeditiously ratified, but quickly adopted into
domestic law.
These two actions, many centuries apart, are only
illustrations of the enduring sense of statehood
possessed by Ethiopia's rulers. There is a whole
history of Ethiopian foreign policy to be written
that includes relations with Egypt and Yemen, the
welcoming and expulsion of the Portuguese and the
decision to adopt an isolationist policy for several
centuries, as well as the beginnings of a modern-era
foreign policy under Emperors Teodros and Yohannes -
the latter who died fighting the Sudanese Mahdists
in defence of Ethiopia.
It was the Emperor Menelik II who first crafted a
truly comprehensive foreign policy, dealing with the
imperial occupiers of the Horn of Africa as equals
and staking out his borders - and in some cases
expanding them - as the scramble for Africa raged
around Ethiopia to north, south, east and west.
Menelik not only played the diplomatic game and
succeeded in making alliances with foreign powers,
with the aim of thwarting others, but he imported
arms from outside.
After the attempted fraud perpetrated by Italians in
the Treaty of Wichale, Menelik was quite capable of
practicing cunning in his own dealings, for example
by buying the loyalty of chiefs and conducting
military campaigns in the south and far south of
Ethiopia. The strategic aim was to forestall British
claims that the Kenyan border should be pushed
further to the north and to expand the reach of the
new imperial state.
Haile Selassie was the true inheritor of Menelik's
statecraft. He learned as much as he could about the
outside world and brought in foreign advisors to
assist Ethiopia. In doing so, he showed great
strategic sense. Haile Selassie knew the dangers of
being beholden to any one foreign power, especially
one with vested interests in the Horn of Africa, so
he looked to smaller countries such as Belgium and
Sweden for assistance, and established relations
with the United States (US) as a counterbalance to
the Europeans on his doorstep.
He established the institutions for a modern foreign
policy and joined the League of Nations - an
organisation which notoriously betrayed Ethiopia at
the time of the Italian invasion. Haile Selassie's
speech to the League of Nations is one of the most
memorable foreign policy speeches by an African head
of state, as well as one of the earliest. After the
Italian occupation, it was the Emperor's foreign
policy that saved him: He had built up sufficient
standing across the world that he could not simply
be cast aside, as were the rulers of every previous
conquered African territory. And when the British
led the military defeat of the Italians, Ethiopia
was not absorbed into the British Empire but
restored to sovereignty.
Reclaiming his throne and restoring full
independence was no mean feat of diplomatic
manoeuvre by the Emperor.
Fearful that history might repeat itself, and
anxious to anchor Ethiopia's survival in as strong
an international matrix as possible, Emperor Haile
Selassie pursued an even more vigorous foreign
policy after his restoration. At the centre of this
was pursuit of the principle of multilateralism. It
was the multilateral League of Nations that had let
down Ethiopia a decade earlier, but nonetheless the
Emperor recognised that a small country could only
preserve its independence by seeking to diversify
its foreign friends as much as possible, and invest
in the new multilateral order.
Ethiopia, a founding member of the UN, was an early
signatory of most of its conventions, and was an
early participant in UN military and peacekeeping
operations, including Korea and Congo. The Emperor
was associated with the Non-Aligned Movement but
also sought close ties with European governments and
the US. Again, he preferred to diversify and deal
with smaller powers without imperial ambition,
including Belgium for training the Imperial
Bodyguard, Sweden for the air force, India for the
military academy, as well as Switzerland and
Yugoslavia.
Ethiopia was one of the first countries to recognise
the People's Republic of China; the Emperor visited
the country before it became fashionable.
One of Haile Selassie's most signal triumphs was his
leading role in establishing the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU). While not a militant Pan
Africanist - he supported maintaining existing
borders, after Ethiopia's own tragic experience with
disputed boundaries - he supported liberation
movements across the continent. These efforts
resulted in a major diplomatic victory, which was
the location of the OAU in Addis Abeba.
The Emperor had realised that independence was
coming to Europe's African colonies and that
Ethiopia's future lay in good relations with its
African neighbours. He played a central role in
bridging the two African liberation groupings - the
Monrovia and Casablanca blocs - to create a unified
African intergovernmental organisation. This in
itself was a formidable achievement which any
country could be proud of.
Thereafter, he devoted much attention to resolving
African conflicts, including the Algeria-Morocco
border war, conflict between Mali and Senegal, coup
attempt in Tanzania, and the first Sudanese civil
war. He supported Africa's liberation movements,
welcoming (among many others) Nelson Mandela to
Addis Abeba and was one of the only two countries
that took South Africa to court over its illegal
occupation of Namibia, the other being Liberia.
Every move was calculated. For example, Ethiopia did
not vote in favour of the UN resolution that
established the state of Israel. Sensitive to the
concerns of Ethiopia's Arab and Muslim neighbours,
he instructed his Ambassador to abstain from the
vote. Good relations between Christians and Muslims
were his priority. He sought - and won - good
relations with Arab states, including Nasser's
Egypt.
These relations were very important in the ongoing
disputes over Eritrea, in which the early Eritrean
nationalists turned to Arab states for support.
Zawdi Retta's recent book on Ethiopian foreign
policy shows the sophistication with which Ethiopia
presented its case on Eritrea to the UN.
For a long time the Emperor served as his own
Foreign Minister. But his government also began
training a cadre of foreign policy experts. A small
group of world class Ethiopian diplomats emerged at
that time. Among them were Lorenzo Tezzazz (who
helped draft the speech to the League of Nations),
Addis Alemayehu(Member of the UN Disarmament
Commission) Ketema Yifru, Aklilu Habtewold, Yilma
Deresa, Tesfaye Gebreigzi, Getachew Kibret (who
drafted the OAU charter) and Kifle Wodajo (who
served as the OAU's acting secretary general for its
first year). These men made Ethiopia into a presence
on the world stage far in excess of its size. They
solidified and expanded the framework of our foreign
policy.
The era of the Derg was an aberration. There was
some continuity - notably in continued support to
Africa's liberation struggle - but the balanced,
farsighted and multilateral policy of the Imperial
era was replaced by exclusive reliance on the Soviet
bloc. Rather than cultivating and expanding the
skilled and gifted diplomats who had led Ethiopia's
international relations, the Derg harassed, exiled
and killed them. The diplomatic corps was paralysed
and almost destroyed.
The EPRDF also came from a leftist tradition, but in
important respects reasserted the old tradition of
multilateral diplomacy and independence from any
outside power bloc. Foreign policy was refashioned,
reverting to the essentials and drawing upon the
depleted assets of the Haile Selassie era. The EPRDF
leaders recognised that the world was changing
rapidly and possessed a good reading of those
changes and what would be necessary for Ethiopia to
thrive amidst them.
The immediate priority was establishing good
relations with those that had been antagonised by
the Derg.
Some of the greatest challenges to the new
government were in the immediate region, notably the
collapse of Somalia and the intensifying war in
Sudan and its destabilising effect on the region.
Eritrean independence was another challenge. The
genocide in Rwanda and the threat of the Great Lakes
descending into turmoil also influenced Ethiopia's
policy - it sent the first post-genocide
peacekeeping force to Rwanda. Foreign policy in a
turbulent region demands continuity and a steady
hand.
The turbulence of Africa in the last 16 years has
demanded that the army be an instrument of foreign
policy. Ethiopia has faced military threats from
three of its neighbours and preserving the country's
sovereignty and pursuing its interests have demanded
the application of military force - selectively in
the case of Somalia and Sudan, massively in the case
of Eritrea.
Yet, the EPRDF government has recognised that the
greatest challenge to Ethiopia's security is the
country's poverty. Chronic poverty, lack of economic
development, and recurrent droughts and food crises,
leave Ethiopia desperately vulnerable and at the
mercy of foreign donors and creditors. This is a
more complex and chronic threat than invasion; it
demands a concerted and sophisticated response.
What emerges from this quick overview of Ethiopia's
foreign policy is that at no stage has Ethiopia
served as the puppet of any foreign power. Even
during the worst days of the Derg, when the
government relied on the Soviet Union, the foreign
policy was Ethiopia's.
Under the Emperor and the EPRDF, it has been an
interest-driven foreign policy, alert to the
complexities of Ethiopia's interests globally and in
the region. Ethiopia has largely been a status-quo
power, valuing stability over disruption -but also
ready to back the just causes of oppressed people,
from southern Africa to southern Sudan. It has been
a predictable and stable policy. It has been an
exercise in balancing, an embrace of multilateral
institutions and multiple global links and
alliances.
Policy is the outcome of careful deliberation;
process, not whim; centralised, but not arbitrary.
Ethiopia's foreign policy tradition is a sound basis
for going forward into the new Millennium.
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