Realising that its almost unqualified support for Sudan was hurting its image, China balanced its thirst for oil versus international obligations and in the process, convinced Sudan to accept United Nations (UN) peacekeepers on its soil.

China has quietly changed its Darfur policy from a laid-back approach to a behind-the-scenes diplomacy.

Before the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1769 authorising the two billion dollars a year, 26,000-strong UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), China arranged low-key meetings with Sudan to discuss the deployment.

For a country that has been Sudan's staunchest diplomatic protector, largest trading partner and a leading investor, the shift is crucial.
 

Beijing has asserted its role and position as a world power by mediating the Darfur crisis. Significantly, this is China's first time in its 35 years at UN Security Council to convince a sovereign country to accept a UN peace keeping force in its territory.

With the Olympics in Beijing next year already attracting more international scrutiny of Chinese affairs, Beijing is styling up and doesn't want to be associated with a repressive regime.
 

China's influence in Khartoum is second to none and could be decisive in resolving the four-year Darfur conflict which has killed an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 people, displacing 2.5 million others in camps strewn across Darfur if not as refugees in Chad.
 

While it has played a crucial role in getting Khartoum to agree on deployment of UNAMID, China should now pressure President al-Bashir and the rebel groups to begin a political process that will see all parties sign and respect a new comprehensive peace agreement.
 

The People's Republic's evidently strong alliance with Sudan is driven by its oil interests. Chinese Petroleum companies have been operating in the country since the departure of western oil majors in the mid-1990s.

In the process, Beijing has deftly filled the diplomatic and economic vacuum, treating the al Bashir regime as a strategic stepping stone to not only the oil fields in South Sudan and Darfur, but also in Chad and Central African Republic.

The 2007 United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UNCOMTRADE) records that China represents as much as 64pc of Khartoum's trade volume.

Between 1999 and 2006, oil exports to China increased from 266,126 tonnes to more than 6.5 million tonnes. A report to European Parliament on China's energy policy in sub-Saharan Africa notes that in 2005 and 2006, China imported 47pc of Sudan's total oil production.

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the largest foreign investor so far in Sudan channelled more than four billion dollars into the country. It is also the main shareholder in the Greater Nile Petroleum Company (GNPOC), Sudan's national oil company.

Accordingly, CNPC has acquired several oil exploitation concessions with a near monopoly over a vast oil block in Darfur.
 

Apart from oil, Chinese companies are doing business in other areas. The Petroleum and Natural Gas Exploration and Development Corporation has implemented a polypropylene exploitation project in Khartoum. Half of the shares in the Khartoum Chemical Industry Company are owned by Beijing which wholly owns the Sudanese Petrochemical Trade Project.
 

With 149 million dollar loan of China's Central Bank, Harbin Power Company constructed the Qarre I hydropower station, about 50Km north of Khartoum which it also manages. Jointly with Qarre II, it will produce 330MW. With an 85pc shareholding, the Chinese energy giant also participated in the construction of the 300MW Kajbar Dam.
 

A 315-man multi-functional engineering unit from China is expected to be deployed in Darfur in early October 2007.
 

To its credit, China has balanced its economic interests, international pressure and insecurity to protect its interests in Darfur and the entire region. Thus, its role in Darfur and readiness not to invoke the sovereignty card and "it is only business" attitude should be seen in the light of protecting its economic interests.

China's foreign policy to Africa has evolved over the years. During the Cold War, Beijing supported groups that fought alleged Western imperialists.
 

When it assumed membership of the UN Security Council in 1971, China opposed all peacekeeping operations in Africa. After the Cold War, this position was replaced with a more moderate approach that viewed Africa's conflicts as born of structural violence, and hence deserving to be resolved as such. While supporting the UN peace keeping missions, it did so on the condition of a well defined and restricted mandate of maintaining sovereignty.
 

Non controversial peacekeeping operations - Somalia (UNSOM I), Mozambique (ONUMUZ), Rwanda (UNAMIR) and Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) got its green light. When the Security Council decided to dispatch troops in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003, China even offered to contribute to this mission.
 

Since then, Beijing gradually increased the number of blue helmets to 1,800 in 2007. China's financial support to peacekeeping by the UN and regional organisations, such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has also increased significantly.
 

In April 2007, Beijing refused to approve a new report of the Expert Panel to the Sanctions Committee. This document described Khartoum's violation of the prohibiting of the transfer of arms to Darfur and recommended the tightening of the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council and further restrictions on activities involving illicit weapons, regardless of who was responsible.
 

Economic curbs as well crashed into Chinese resistance. Beijing has sold helicopter gunships, transport helicopters and military trucks to Sudan, which have been used in recent attacks on civilians in Darfur.
 

Late 2006 was a busy year for Beijing when it dangled a carrot minus the stick. During the High Level Consultation on the Situation in Darfur in Addis Abeba on November 16 2006, China intervened to obtain the acceptation of the hybrid force.
 

Wang Guangya, China's ambassador to the United Nations (UN) was reported to have told Khartoum Foreign Minister Lam Akol that there was no hidden agenda in the effort to introduce a stronger peacekeeping force.
 

Prior to this meeting, several high-ranking Chinese officials had already discussed the different options when President Omar al-Bashir arrived in Beijing for the Forum on the China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit. His Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, publicly appealed to Khartoum to find an appropriate settlement, maintain stability, and constantly improve the humanitarian conditions in the region.

This statement was sustained during President Hu's visit to Sudan in early February 2007 that Annan's hybrid plan had to be respected. This marked the first time China was actively persuading a sovereign government to assent the deployment of blue helmets in its territory.
 

Forced to reconcile its business agenda with peace and security in Africa, Chinese President Hu Jintao, has promised to partly fund UNAMID. It is imperative that on June 15, 2006, the Chinese government granted AMIS 3.5 million dollars in budgetary support and humanitarian emergency aid. From the sum, 2.5 million dollars was to be allocated to assisting refugees and one million dollars for budgetary support of the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council.

While welcoming passing of the Darfur resolution, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said it was an "important step to promote the process of resolving the Darfur issue."
 

China is thus pursuing a two-pronged strategy that entails a balanced combination of political processes and the peacekeeping mission to promote a complete settlement to the Darfur conflict. Together with the international community, China should immediately put pressure on Khartoum and the rebel groups not to renege on the peace agreements.
 

China's efforts in Darfur, however, are very state-centric, leaving out the rebels and other regional actors, which is why the chairman of the Sudan Liberation Movement, Abdelwahid al-Nur, has accused China of underwriting Khartoum's killings in Darfur.

According to al Nur, China's partiality in the conflict creates a very dangerous situation for her investments in Sudan and all over Africa in the long run.

Definitely China's intervention in Darfur has succeeded, for the Asian power has secured its economic interests in Sudan while taking the credit for getting Khartoum to accept the UN peacekeepers.

Worldwide, China was praised for its "constructive policy." It not only gained moral credibility among African countries but also strengthened its position in multilateral forums like UN, Arab League and AU.

China's diplomatic success notwithstanding, the insecurity in Darfur has forced humanitarian agencies to scale back their activities drastically. Consensus on the way out of the mire seems to be coalescing around: diplomatic pressure on Khartoum to rein in the militias, halt its proxy war against its neighbours and cease aerial bombardment of civilians in villages, IDP camps within Darfur and refugee camps in Chad.

The second important factor in the search for a consensus is the removal of any diplomatic and resource-related barriers to the deployment of UNAMID force to protect civilians and sustain dialogue within and between the various parties to the Darfur conflict as the best solution.

Thirdly, Africa and its external partners - including China - have to stabilise the region and create conditions for a return of the displaced, and more promising political negotiations.