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The Cotonou Agreement states that the objective of
the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) is "to
reduce poverty by supporting the sustainable
development and the gradual integration of the ACP
countries into the world economy".
Together, these aims constitute the core benchmarks,
or as defined here, Development Benchmarks. When the
Africa, Pacific and Caribbean (ACP) countries
entered into the EPA negotiations, they believed
that these objectives would be achieved through the
signing of an agreement. With the December 2007
deadline fast approaching, negotiators still face
the challenge of creating a coherent and systematic
framework that fosters these benchmarks within the
EPAs.
In order to genuinely deliver on these goals, EPA
provisions have to be linked with real development
prospects for the ACP. This can only happen,
however, once ACP countries increase the revenue,
diversity and value addition of their exports. If
they do not, any incentive that the EPAs offer may
not only fail to work, but could also generate
undesirable results and continue to perpetuate the
status quo.
While trade liberalisation is a fundamental piece of
the EPA puzzle, it is not sufficient in and of
itself. Adequate institutional capacities, coupled
with complimentary domestic policies that support
liberalisation, are necessary to make the process
effective and beneficial.
Trade agreements must therefore incorporate analysis
that focuses not only on the immediate implications
of trade liberalisation and reform, but also on
other policy areas that support the overarching
development strategies, if their benefits are to be
fully realised.
Analysis should inextricably link trade agreements
to development goals by benchmarking targets in
relation to national poverty reduction and
development strategies. These components will thus
enable trade agreements to effectively support
accelerated and sustained development.
It follows that the EPAs must be based on stages of
ACP countries' development, rather than arbitrary
timetables. These stages must be identified by
setting milestones, which once reached, should be
followed by the implementation of reforms -
including tariff dismantling.
A regular review of the ACP states must also be
undertaken to determine each country's progress
against the set targets. These evaluations must
determine whether the milestones have been reached
by the individual ACP country, and how - if at all -
the European Union's (EU) trade and development
policies have contributed towards meeting these
objectives.
This 'Trade for Development' framework introduces a
novel way of enabling trade agreements to work for
ACP countries. Not only does it mandate that any
trade agreement, including an EPA, acts as a vehicle
for achieving sustained development, but this
framework requires that countries are also
accountable for their progress through rigorous
review mechanisms. These pieces of the puzzle were
clearly lacking from previous preferential trade
agreements like the Lomé Convention, to the
detriment of ACP countries.
WHY ARE DEVELOPMENT BENCHMARKS DESIRABLE?
Arbitrary mechanisms - such as universal timetables
for development - are ineffective and lack causal
explanations for their reforms precisely because of
their arbitrary nature. The implementation of dated
milestones, however, provides a useful and logical
explanation for liberalisation commitments.
Aid for Trade (AfT), a concept wholeheartedly
supported by major trading countries, including the
EU, articulates a similar message. One of the
founding pillars of AfT says that if market access
is to be meaningful, beneficiary countries must own
the process, from conceptualisation to
operationalisation.
This sense of ownership and accountability often
maximises potential benefits by ensuring that the
process is demand-driven and needs-based. The Trade
for Development framework fine tunes this concept by
providing a clear definition and a realistic
expectation about what can be achieved and the
context in which it can be implemented.
If the EPAs are to deliver on their objectives, they
must address a lack of genuine market access and the
supply-side constraints that relegate most of the
ACP's exports to primary commodities. This implies
that the EPAs incorporate a consistent,
comprehensive and predictable set of actions that
systematically, and within a definite timeframe,
oblige the contracting parties to address the
problems.
Moreover, the Development Benchmarks have to be
quantifiable and set clear goals for ACP countries
to strive for individually and as a region. At the
same time, only robust and sustainable economic
growth will enable ACP states to achieve the
Development Benchmarks. The issue therefore becomes
how best to use the EPAs as a tool to achieve and
sustain better economic performance in each ACP
country.
In order to accomplish the Development Benchmarks,
ACP countries must be able to fulfil the following
indicators or 'key tests': Increase their current
export volume and revenue; diversify their export
base; and add value to their current exports.
Sustaining a vigorous level of growth and
transformation of exports requires policy actions in
each ACP country that may not be directly addressed
in the EPA negotiations. However, bolstered by
national development policies, these goals have a
chance of being attained.
What is suggested here is not an outcome, but a
consistent trade related set of actions taken in an
expected and definite timeframe by both the EU and
the ACP. If implemented, this may lead to the
realisation of the key indicators outlined above,
which in turn could boost overall economic growth
and set the ACP countries on a definite course to
achieve the Development Benchmarks.
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