If there is anything Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and critics of Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia have in common, it is perhaps their equal enthusiasm to prove or disprove that Somalia is Africa's Iraq. Interestingly, seven months of Ethiopia's military presence there has a striking resemblance to the dilemma the United States (US) faces in Iraq, although the circumstances of their involvement in the first place were understandably different.

The US entered Iraq after a failed attempt to convince the world that Iraq's Saddam Hussein had allegedly concealed weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Its policy of pre-emption divided the world opinion and led President George W. Bush to assemble the "coalition of the willing" that took the country over from Saddam. The claimed weapons were nowhere to be found, an event that robed the "cradle of democracy" of its moral high ground in the eyes of much of the world.

Ethiopia entered Somalia to pre-empt and neutralise the growing threat posed by the leadership of a militant organisation, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), and their coalition of backers spearheaded by its foe, Eritrea. Unlike the US forces that had to oust a regime and attempt to install a brand new government, Ethiopia was invited by a transitional government that enjoys international recognition and it had to go it alone.

Nevertheless, entering Baghdad in fast pace was as unexpected as Ethiopia's unanticipated advances in controlling Mogadishu within a few days of the beginning of the war. In the face of the US's and Ethiopia's military might, both of their antagonists had little power to withstand. Ironically, both found winning wars much easier than winning the peace, although leaders of each country had declared victory few days after their respective forces controlled the capitals of Somalia and Iraq.

Today, both countries find themselves in a political and military quagmire of a different degree in the respective cities they have conquered; they fight a series of urban rebel attacks. The kind of headache Iran gives to the US in taking advantage of the situation in Iraq is very much akin to the role of Eritrea in Somalia, which uses the situation to continuously provoke Ethiopia. Both foes aide militant rebels to ensure that their archenemies do not succeed in their military involvements.   

Regardless of the different reasons that compelled them to reach the respective situations they find themselves in today, Ethiopia is desperate to leave Somalia as much as the US is to withdraw its forces from Iraq. For both, though, doing so prematurely has expensive consequences that would undue everything they have fought for in the first place. The survival of the embattled transitional governments in Mogadishu and Baghdad is predictably unlikely should Ethiopia and the US abandon their respective holds, although both have local constituencies that urge their respective governments for immediate withdrawals no matter what the consequences are.

Both have partner transitional governments that are too weak to stand on their own. Thus, both countries have taken upon themselves the responsibilities to help build military capabilities of the respective countries to fight their own wars, urban guerrillas, terrorist attacks and suicide bombers. Unfortunately, the legitimacy of the transitional governments in Baghdad and Mogadishu is a thorny issue that plagues their respective political discourses. Amidst all these, both the US and Ethiopia are in a situation where they are damned if they do and damned if they do not.

Luckily for Ethiopia, the situation in Somalia does not seem to have reached a point of no return as it has in Iraq; with sectoral violence along religious sects proceeding almost unabated and the scale of violence is markedly different in Baghdad and Mogadishu. It does not seem too late for Ethiopia to draw a different course in helping to bring national reconciliation among the various factions in Somalia who have been killing one another for the past 16 years. 

Ethiopia went into Somalia with a defined goal of removing the threat posed by the fundamentalist elements of the UIC. If the Prime Minister failed to keep his promises of withdrawal within days, if not weeks, of accomplishing his mission, it is understandable that the continued threat posed against the transitional government dictated the change of mind. This does not mean, however, Ethiopia shall stay there forever, for it is too poor to finance drawn-out military adventures.

Ethiopia was meant to pave the way and facilitate the ground for the takeover of the African Union (AU) peacekeeping forces, part of which has been waiting ever since the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Abdulahi Yusuf was created in Kenya two years ago. Today, it is only 1,700 of these soldiers from Uganda that are in Mogadishu, while the remaining 6,500 promised forces from other African countries have yet to be deployed. This includes 1,700 troops pledged by Burundi and 850 each from Nigeria and Malawi.

Their respective governments blame lack of financial assistance from Western donors and poor logistical support from the AU for their inability to send these troops. If there are people who see little incentive for the Western donors, particularly the US and the European Union (EU), to pump money that would guarantee Ethiopia's withdrawal, it is understandable.

These countries may want to ensure that Somalia has reached  a point where it will not slide back to violence and lawlessness before a formidable military force hardened with battle and tested with its strength is out of the picture.

Clearly, Western countries keenly sit back and watch the conflict, benefiting from Ethiopia's peacekeeping efforts, free of casualties.

This smells bad for Ethiopia: the more it stays in Somalia, a neighbour with whom it had a couple of battles with since the 1960s, the more it becomes part of the problem than the solution it ought to be. Staying longer not only has undisclosed economic loss to it, but also forces it to be entrapped by the local complexities of the Somali internal politics, in a manner where Syria is involved in Lebanon. The more it stays in Somalia, the more it is seen as an occupying force in the eyes of increasing numbers of Somalis, including those who have chosen to give Ethiopia the benefit of the doubt now.   

After all, Ethiopia has soldiers in Somalia that represent a country whose interests are too close to be considered a neutral peacekeeper by anyone involved.

Looking at the price from a more domestic perspective, staying in Somalia means more Ethiopian troops losing their lives and escalating war expenditures, though exact figures on the economic toll are withheld by the government from Parliament and the general public. That is regrettable. In this sense, the cost of staying is more than hard to swallow.

What is apparent from this delicate balancing act authorities in Addis Abeba are trying to pull off is that the cost of perpetuating the existing scenario cannot be accepted for too much longer.

They have put their faith on whether the national reconciliation the TFG is attempting, for a fourth time, to hold today, July 15, in Mogadishu, goes ahead. Ideally, this conference will bring a diverse group of politicians, former war-lords and moderate members of the toppled UIC for clan reconciliation and negotiation in power sharing based on the transitional federal charter. It has proven to be much easier said than done.

It appears as if even the simplifying act of reducing those invited members to around 1,300 from the original 3,000 may not bring this landmark conference to a successful closure. Reports coming from employees at the Mogadishu airport and from local hotel owners do not indicate an influx of conference goers, nor are the subsequent protection forces that would be required to guard the high-profile individuals in the war ravaged capital conspicuous to the eyes of residents. Government's reports that over 800 delegates arrived before Friday are difficult to confirm.

What is more noticeable to those who are bearing through the violence that engulfs the capital is numerous attacks on high level officials and more casualties, civilian and military or insurgent alike. Explosions ripped through the central Bakara market of the capital on Thursday, marking the seventh straight day exacting a sad human toll, this time at least six, as well as making business impossible and thus furthering the economic strain the conflict has imposed.

Moreover, an explosion attack on Mogadishu's Mayor, Mohamed Dheere's life on Thursday, the second in two months, as well as the assault on Justice Minister Hassan Dhimbil's residence two weeks back, show the times are trying for Ethiopian and Somalia forces attempting to impose peace. This violence targeting politicians is merely a background for the hardship average Ethiopian troops are facing. Violence appears to be escalating though official statistics are glaringly lacking.

Those behind the attack are attempting to disrupt the conference, despite the increasing desire by disgruntled groups to attend, provided that it is inclusive of all and responsive to their demands. That is where the challenge lies for Ethiopia. The conference is all about winning credibility from the otherwise sceptical majority of Somalis both inside and outside. It should not necessarily be seen as a drama staged by the forces of the TFG, largely from the Darod clan, at the exclusion of the Hawiee and moderate members of the UIC.

Ethiopia's Prime Minister for one has never used blanket rejection of the UIC as a group, nor its entire leadership. What Somalia is craving for is leaders who command respect across the dividing lines of clan.

Thus, persuading TFG leaders to invite these leaders, such as Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and former Speaker of the TFG Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, could help get the much needed credibility in the eyes of those who believe it is all the TFG show. Of course, these people should concede not to demand an immediate withdrawal of Ethiopia's forces as a condition to their participation at future reconciliation dialogues.

It may not bring the saga to a close; but at least it will serve as a sign of a future that may work and give hope to many that have so far failed to see anything but despair.