A latent conflict over the distribution of water from the Nile River has been unfolding in Northeast Africa for several years. This conflict could very well add to the already existing tension in the region. Insufficient rainfall, widespread famine, rapid population growth, and the desire for economic development have made the downstream of water a contentious issue among the riparian states.
 

On the core of the emerging conflict lies a 1959 treaty between Egypt and Sudan -- excluding all other riparian states -- that regulates the distribution of water from the Nile among the two signature powers; the treaty has disproportionately favored Egypt, which was, at the time, the hegemonic power in Northeast Africa. Other African states have, however, developed their economies in recent years and face high population growth levels. These developments have led them to demand a greater share of Nile River water.
 

While other countries face similar challenges, Ethiopia has been the major protagonist in challenging the Egyptian position. Eight-five percent of the Nile water passing through Egypt comes from the famine-ridden country of Ethiopia. Egypt has so far maintained that any unilateral action to make use of Nile River water would be regarded as a breach of international law and has even threatened to go to war should Ethiopia take further steps without first consulting Cairo.
 

Ethiopia, the most populous country in the Horn of Africa, needs to develop its irrigation system to end the decades-long dependency on foreign food relief; at the same time, however, Egypt's population is growing rapidly, increasing water demand. Moreover, roughly 95 percent of Egypt's territory is inhospitable desert. Cairo has even built new cities for its growing population, projects that require even more water. Both countries are striving to develop their economies and to feed their populations, while climactic changes are making droughts more widespread.
 

The distribution of Nile River water has been regulated by the 1929 Blue Nile agreement between the United Kingdom and Egypt, and the 1959 agreement between Sudan and Egypt. The latter gave Cairo a de facto right to veto any project using Nile water in other riparian states. Although this treaty remained unchallenged over the years, this is no longer the case. Indeed, many African states have experienced robust GDP growth rates in recent years -- with the notable exception of Eritrea, which suffers immensely due to its border war with Ethiopia and its devastating economic policy of self-reliance -- and this has increased their need to develop their infrastructure, produce more energy, and provide more water to their populations. Understandably, the majority of the Nile River countries now want to renegotiate the decades-old treaties.
 

Sudan, currently improving its position as a result of high oil prices and substantial oil exports, also demands a greater share of Nile River water. In August 1995, Khartoum threatened to withdraw from the 1959 treaty on the grounds that it was unable to use the Nile water as needed to develop its economy. Thus far, Khartoum has refrained from withdrawing from the agreement, but the 2011 referendum on independence for the south of the country would make renegotiation inevitable if the referendum is in fact being held, something Cairo is strongly opposed to.
 

Other Nile basin countries have also developed a greater interest in Nile River water. Uganda would like to use more water for the production of hydroelectric power, and Tanzania wants to extract water from Lake Victoria, one of the sources of the Nile, in a 27.6 billion dollar project to pipe water to development areas in the east.
 

The conflict has already led to setbacks in the peace processes in the broader Horn of Africa region. Conflict resolution efforts in Somalia failed several times when Cairo felt its interests were not taken into account. Egypt supported the 2000 Arta Conference in Djibouti aimed at restoring peace in war-torn Somalia in what led to the formation of the Transitional National Government. While partially successful in concluding a power-sharing deal among Somali warlords, Ethiopia felt that the transitional government was infiltrated by radical Islamists belonging to al-Ittihad al-Islami and withdrew from the process, while Egypt supported the process with the aim of re-establishing Somalia as a counterweight to Ethiopian influence.
 

After the Arta process failed, a new effort for Somali reconciliation was undertaken by Kenya under the auspices of I.G.A.D. in 2002. The process reached a climax with the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) in late 2004 and its relocation to Somalia in July 2005. The TFG became isolated after Islamists achieved a stunning victory in Mogadishu in June 2006 and restored some form of law and order in the capital. This time, it seems, Arab countries did not actively support the initiative in what they perceived was an Ethiopian and Kenyan dominated effort.

With an unresolved border conflict with Eritrea in the east and a Somali uprising in the Ogaden region in the south, the Egyptian government assumed that Addis Ababa would not want to provoke Cairo over the water issue. However, Ethiopia's large population and its impressive GDP growth rate have made Addis Ababa recognize that economic development is increasingly tied to its ability to use its natural resources, and the Nile water system is in that sense perhaps its most important asset.

Under the framework of the Nile Basin Initiative, all Nile basin countries -- the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Tanzania -- are now discussing changes in the 1959 agreement on a rather professional basis. The number of involved countries and their often contradicting interests are making the success of these talks highly unlikely. While the population of these countries is expected to double within the next three decades, Nile water is becoming scarcer than ever.

Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, are playing a rather less aggressive role in the politics in the Horn of Africa since the September 11 attacks, realizing that the United States is becoming more interested in the region in an effort to contain radical Islamists. At this time, prospects for a new deal on the distribution of Nile River water are plagued with uncertainty.