|
Many people hoped that the conference in Copenhagen,
Denmark, would be a turning point in terms of delivering
meaningful responses to the climate crisis. Expectations for
an ambitious and legally binding treaty reached a climax. A
few weeks before the Copenhagen Summit, rumours spread that
a legally binding treaty might not be possible in
Copenhagen. A political agreement was what the whole world
was told to expect.
In
Copenhagen, there was some progress that could serve as a
steppingstone for future action. After painstaking
negotiations, lots of wrangling, and a stalemate, the
delayed meeting culminated with a nonbinding political
document called "The Copenhagen Accord." It consists of a
three page, 12 paragraph deal.
The
process to reach this agreement was more tormenting than a
World Cup final match decided on a penalty shootout.
On a
positive note, we have seen major break-throughs, including
the United States coming on board in climate negotiations.
No matter how extremely low the emissions reduction it
offered was (four per cent below 1990 levels, against the
25pc to 40pc advised by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change [IPCC]), an effective climate regime without
this giant polluter would be impossible.
The accord, if it were to become legally binding, would
have covered in excess of 85pc of all global emissions,
unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which mandated reductions
amounting to just 30pc of the same.
Big developing countries agreed to cut emissions
voluntarily and partly conceded to international
verification processes for their mitigation efforts.
It was also encouraging to see some commitment to near-term
and long-term mitigation and adaptation financing, because
such financial pledges were non-existent until Copenhagen.
Nevertheless, the accord is not all that good. Its major
downsides include failing to incorporate binding targets,
monitoring mechanisms and legal force. Even the mitigation
funds pledged are not adequate nor based on science; they
are inadequate and full of ambiguities.
Delegates merely took note of the accord, instead of
welcoming or adopting it. This made the possibility of a
legally binding deal even more remote.
As it stands, the temperature limit of two degrees Celsius
that the world has agreed to is not to the liking of the
Alliance of Small Island States. The latter has been
demanding a more ambitious 1.5 degree Celsius target, taking
its member countries' specific and legitimate circumstances
into account.
The world
has agreed that deep cuts in global emissions are required,
according to the science of the IPCC Fourth Assessment
Report, in order to reduce global emissions so that the
increase in the global temperature stays below two degrees
Celsius. However, new reports since 2007 have confirmed that
the changes are happening faster than earlier anticipated.
A report titled "The Copenhagen Diagnosis," released by a
team of 26 IPCC members just before the Copenhagen Summit is
very relevant in this respect. It underlines that
anthropogenic greenhouse gases are surging more rapidly, ice
sheets, glaciers and icecaps are melting much faster, and
the sea level is rising more rapidly, as well.
What has been pledged in terms of emissions cuts is not
sufficient to keep the temperature rise below two degrees
Celsius. Given the current national circumstances in major
emitter countries, the possibility of getting more ambitious
science-based reductions is almost zero. What is more
disappointing is that the long-term target of 50pc to 80pc
emissions reductions by 2050 disappeared in the final
version of the accord, though it existed in earlier drafts.
The whole emissions cuts saga gets even more troubling when
considering the loopholes in the accord. A typical example
is that not all cuts have to be done domestically,
misleading parties to consider all offset emissions as truly
reduced emissions.
A major roadblock is the commitment for emissions cuts in
view of their varying degrees of pledges.
Some parties such as Norway and Scotland set good examples
by committing deep science based cuts. The European Union (EU)
was close with a 20pc reduction pledge. Some other countries
such as Japan, Russia, and New Zealand have shown signs of
backtracking from earlier reduction commitments. In
Australia, political wrangling led to disastrous decisions,
just a few weeks ago.
The
question now is whether countries will sort out all this
mess and come up with a binding deal in 2010. The truth,
however bitter it is, is that the deadline for the legally
binding deal also disappeared in the final version of the
accord.
Rich
countries have pledged in the accord to near-term funding of
30 billion dollars to be disbursed between 2010 and 2012 and
100 billion dollars per year by 2020 to all developing
countries.
The
statement in the pledge is full of promising words decorated
with jargon such as "scaled up, new and additional,
predictable and adequate funding as well as improved
access." Reading between the lines, however, there are some
issues of grave concern.
The
funding is far from adequate. The total financing needs for
the mitigation and adaptation of developing countries is
estimated at 250 million dollars per year, according to the
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA).
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
has estimated annual global costs for adaptation at 40
billion dollars to 170 billion dollars.
However,
the International Institute for Environment and Development
(IIED) warns that these estimates were produced too quickly
and did not include key sectors such as energy,
manufacturing, retailing, mining, tourism and ecosystems.
IIED
estimates adaptation costs for the sectors the UNFCCC
studied to be two to three times greater. Likewise, a World
Bank report released in 2009 suggests that the cost, between
2010 and 2050, of adapting to an approximately two degree
Celsius warmer world by 2050 is in the range of 75 billion
dollars to 100 billion dollars a year.
The near
and long-term pledges in the accord will most probably make
only half of the money available for adaptation.
Besides
all this, the financial plan lacks clarity on midterm
financing from 2012 to 2020. If left open, there is the
possibility that we would end up with the smallest amount
available. The more worrying part is that there is no
guarantee that the money would be new and additional to
existing official development assistance.
A good
illustration is the EU pledge for the near-term funding.
European aid agencies have disclosed that the majority of
these contributions would involve recycled older
commitments, re-branded as "climate finance." The
realisation of the existence of mere rhetoric should start
from these near-term funding agreements.
The accord
states that the funding will come from a wide variety of
sources, although it leaves the amount of contributions from
countries vague. However, I would argue for a large chunk of
this money to be sourced from public finance, which is
relatively more predictable and sustainable in the event of
economic crisis or market speculation.
The BASIC
bloc, consisting of four big developing states - Brazil,
South Africa India, and China - served as the perfect
fallback position when the big G77 bloc split on some key
issues. The latter, chaired by Ambassador Lumumba stanislaus
Di-Aping of the Sudan, consistently consolidated support on
issues that served the interests of the BASIC countries. The
end, however, was quite terrible with a stab in the back for
the G77 bloc.
The final
accord, which the BASIC countries reportedly agreed with the
US on, offered way below what Ambassador Lumumba was calling
for.
For the
record, during a briefing for delegates from the civil
society, Lumumba put forward a number of very ambitious
demands including a 1.5 degree Celsius goal with emissions
cuts of 52pc, 65pc, 80pc and over 100pc by 2017, 2020, 2030
and 2050 respectively; the safeguarding of the Kyoto
Protocol at any cost; and fast track funding of 400 billion
dollars to half a trillion dollars in the next five years of
which 150 billion dollars would be released immediately.
Delegates
from G77 countries are not the only ones disappointed with
the results of the Copenhagen summit. Following expressions
of delight over the outcome from China and India, British
Climate Minister Ed Miliband had particularly accused China
for hijacking the climate talks. He blamed its leaders for
the omission of a long-term emission target for 2050.
A senior
Chinese official responded that such goals would be empty
unless rich countries vow to make steeper cuts in emissions
and agree on how to parcel out the remaining share of the
global emissions "budget." He cautioned that the right and
space to develop will be key in upcoming climate talks and
hence the coming year will be very demanding. Nothing will
be easy to address.
I find it interesting to note that the BASIC bloc has been
flexing its growing political muscle to seal a compromise
deal that protects national sovereignty. When it comes to
global warming, I am still struggling to understand why the
BASIC bloc just ignored Lumumba's G77 position in the final
hours at the cost of the interests of those in least
developed countries.
I also see that the existing political will may remain too
weak to address the escalating planetary crisis. The future
still holds huge challenges mainly in translating the
political agreement into a legally binding treaty. All of us
should work hard to build on the momentum - no matter how
little - created in Copenhagen.
Environmental activist Bill McKibben said the 10 billion
dollars, fairly divided amongst affected people, would buy
everybody a Coke. Let us enjoy the Coke for another three
years and get energised to work and fight for climate
justice. |
