The short answer is no - it is not. An examination of the rules and practices of the World Trade Organization (WTO) shows that the organization's rules do not infringe upon the right of its member states to decide on domestic economic issues.

While the WTO is indeed a rules-based system, meaning all members must abide by the same rules, it provides ample policy space to allow member countries to take protective measures if and when their domestic industries are threatened, including policy actions to address any sudden surge in imports that may threaten strategic industries.  

One of the principal features of the modern state is its ability to exercise full control, or sovereignty, over issues within its jurisdiction. With this understanding in mind, many opponents of the WTO argue that the organization limits member states from fully exercising their sovereign rights. Given the relative dominance of economic and trade issues in global affairs in recent years, it is not surprising that the issue of economic sovereignty is particularly resonant with respect to the WTO. 

Nevertheless, the issue of sovereignty is not unique to the WTO. This topic is relevant whenever a country enters into an international agreement with one or more countries. Such agreements inevitably restrict a nation's ability to act unilaterally.  When becoming a signatory of multilateral agreements, a country binds itself to conform to the basic tenets of each agreement or treaty.

WTO rules operate in the same manner. All members agree to be bound by the same rules, regulations and guidelines, particularly those related to transparency and equal treatment, required by various WTO agreements. 

However, despite these conformity requirements, the WTO system recognizes the sovereign and independent needs of individual member states. The WTO rules support a country's right to pursue its own development objectives and does not prohibit a country from following its own domestic economic, developmental and social policies.

For instance, there is no WTO rule that requires countries to follow a given economic ideology or model, either as part of the accession process or as the "price" of membership. This fact is further evidenced by taking into consideration the 154 member states of the WTO, which range from market economies to countries that have embraced mixed economies with more government intervention.

Thus, in the case of Ethiopia, the country's bid to join the WTO will not require the adoption of any particular economic model nor will it be required to change its domestic policies in order to join the WTO.

In general, WTO rules are characterized by the provision of policy space, or flexibility for member countries to set their individual domestic policy agendas.  This "policy space" is manifested in several ways. The first of these concerns tariff rates and specifically, bound tariff rates, which represent the maximum tariff rate that a country may apply to any import item. Negotiating this "bound" or "maximum tariff rate," has been the bedrock of the multilateral trading system since its inception in 1947. However, a clear distinction must be made between "bound" and "applied rates."

A bound tariff rate is the maximum tariff rate on goods that a country agrees it will not exceed, while the applied tariff rate is the actual tariff rate that is applied to imports. Although WTO members and acceding countries may reference applied rates during accession negotiations, the final "bound" or "maximum tariff rates" usually allow a country to maintain flexibility should there be a need to raise tariff rates in the future.

Hence, there is a substantial difference between members' applied and bound tariff rates. For instance, Cambodia, a least-developed country (LDC) that joined the WTO in October 2004, had an average applied tariff rate of 16.4pc but managed to negotiate an average bound rate of 30pc. In similar fashion, Nepal, another LDC that joined the Organization in April 2004, negotiated an average bound rate of 42pc while its average applied tariff rate was just 11pc.

In the case of Ethiopia, it is reasonable to expect that the country will not be asked to lower its average applied rate, which is presently 17.5pc.

After negotiations with WTO member countries, Ethiopia will likely arrive at an agreed upon average bound rate that is higher than its current average applied tariff rate of 17.5pc.

The second type of policy flexibility that is granted to WTO members takes the form of special exceptions to the WTO's basic guiding rules and principles. One of these exceptions allows countries the ability to take measures to safeguard their balance of payments.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor to the WTO, provides that a member country can impose quantitative restrictions on imports to "safeguard its external financial position and its balance of payments." This is what is known as a safeguards exception. The GATT permits countries to enact safeguard measures to protect their domestic industries where imports of a product surge to such an extent as to "cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products."

The same agreement also contains a dedicated article detailing other exceptional circumstances under which countries may impose restrictions on imports to protect domestic industries. These include the need to protect public morale, human, animal or plant life or health and other specific circumstances.

These provisions illustrate the many ways in which the WTO provides leeway for countries to counter potentially adverse effects on their domestic economies and to protect values considered crucial for broader economic and social policymaking.

Even where WTO member countries are found to be in violation of WTO rules, the procedures to bring trade practices into conformity allow countries to choose the specific manner in which they will resolve the violation. Under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism, disagreements between member countries are heard by dispute settlement panels and an appellate body.

The proceedings at these panels and the appellate body are carried out much like that of a regular court, where each party presents arguments and evidence to the bodies. Decisions made by the panels and the appellate body include recommendations to the country at fault that brings the disputed action into consistency with WTO rules.  However, such decisions do not dictate how the country should rectify the dispute. Inconsistent measures typically involve a specific domestic executive or legislative action, meaning that specific measures are left to each country alone to decide. 

This ensures that the WTO does not interfere with the sovereign affairs of the concerned country. Alternatively, the WTO may allow the injured country to impose countermeasures that offset the action of the guilty country which can include suspension of concessions or other obligations by the aggrieved country.

The examples presented above demonstrate that WTO rules provide ample policy space for governments to fulfill commitments under WTO agreements, and at the same time allow countries to implement domestic economic, developmental and social policy agendas.

WTO membership does not require the sacrifice of a nation's sovereignty. It rather provides a platform for economic development and trade, giving member countries leverage in the international marketplace to secure favourable trade terms, while at the same time protecting domestic industries.