Exactly a year ago, this newspaper ran an editorial focusing on the prospects for the ruling EPRDF. It explored the desire by the rank and file within the Revolutionary Democratic camp for change, however unarticulated it was. It was not clear whether the desire is change in form (leadership) or substance (policies).

A year later, the ruling party has finally come about to announce to the public that it will embark upon a succession process of its leadership in the coming five years. There will be a three-phase course of actions. Some of the leaders, judged by the depth of their commitments and how energetic they would remain, will be replaced at the start of the next term. Others will be relieved of their positions in the middle of the next term and few others, including the chairman, Meles Zenawi, will concede their positions both in the party and the government at the end of the term, the party announced this week.

It will be a bold, courageous and historically unprecedented move on the part of the Revolutionary Democrats. No other group which has held political power in Ethiopia has ever dared to lay down its plan of succession before - not during imperial Ethiopia, and certainly not during the reign of the junior military officers.

For those who dream of a day when political power is transferred from an incumbent to a successor, the day might be near. If indeed the succession of political power is achieved within an establishment or among contending parties in a peaceful manner and with no one paying in blood - as the tradition has dictated, the Revolutionary Democrats indeed deserve credit and praise.

Ironically though, the statement issued by the Council of the ruling EPRDF tells a lot more of the story than its series of decisions on issues of provisions of social services, succession plan, and its strategy for the forthcoming election. The statement presupposes that the incumbent would remain in power for the coming five years, albeit in the face of a national election in eight months. It may.

Nevertheless, judging from recent history of electoral politics in Ethiopia, it is very difficult to predetermine the outcomes of elections however much they may appear to be taken for granted. Whether or not the ruling coalition has underestimated the degree of public discontent on its policies and implementations, as it did in the previous election, will be clear in few months. Its leaders believe that they have taken the stock and barrel from their previous "electoral rude awakening".

Equally though, there are a great deal of lessons to be drawn by the opposition bloc, which is as fragmented, incoherent and divided as it was during the previous electoral showdown. Sadly, it took few years and a lot of bickering amongst themselves to accept that they were ill prepared to even handle the electoral bonanza they had been showered with during the previous election.

They had made a terrible error in judgement last time. They had wrongly interpreted what was an electoral denial of the vote of confidence for the incumbent as an endorsement to their hashed up policy alternatives.

Post electoral processes showed the opposition bloc doing a lot more harm to itself than the assault they could have suffered from their all too powerful adversary. It is clear now, that had many of the political parties and their leaders the courage, the patience, and a little less populism, they would have been better positioned - today - to pose electoral challenge to the incumbent. That several of the opposition leaders have committed a blunder and squandered an opportunity after their rejection of joining the federal parliament is what their staunch supporters and brutal critics of the Revolutionary Democrats have come to admit. Albeit belatedly!

Unlike other rules of political engagement, electoral politics requires a platform and there is hardly any better platform out there than the existing national institutions, with all their gaps, shortcomings and imperfections. Putting political weight behind the effort to strengthen such institutions, which is meant to watchdog the behaviours of the incumbent, serves the interests of the opposition bloc in more ways than it does those within the sphere of the ruling coalition.

Regrettably, the opposition bloc did as much damage as the ruling coalition, albeit differently, in attacking the integrity and credibility of society's institutions such as the parliament, electoral board as well as the media and law enforcement agencies.

Hopefully, all contending parties, including the incumbent, have picked up a lesson or two from their previous misadventures in denying acknowledgment and reluctance in respecting these institutions.

It would be of great help to the electorate, should the opposition come to terms with itself sooner rather than later in putting its house in order.

The consolidation process in forming the electoral front to challenge the incumbent remains at its early stages. The forum spearheaded by Seyee Abraha and Negasso Gidada (PhD), bringing onboard close to 14 political parties, appears to be an interesting development to watch, though. Hailu Shawel's (Eng.) All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP) and Lidetu Ayalew's Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP) are the other parties which seem to have little desire to join any effort of groupings, for they have suffered the consequences of coalition adventure in the past. For the moment, they are proponents of unilateralist activities.

Sadly, the various opposition groups have began attacking one another, unable to muster their collective influence even when negotiating with the incumbent over the electoral code of conduct. They still seem to lack the mutual respect for one another; lest they work together on issues of shared interests and concerns and to act individually where there are no commonalities.

However, there is a lot they could have as shared values. For instance, trying to set precedence in dealing with one another in a manner that is mutually respectful and in recognition of their respective roles and places within the electorate, and irrespective of their differences on policies, is one area. This could be the sort of thing that requires no meddling from the incumbent, thus no claim of narrowed or wide political space.

Demonstrating to the electorate that the various opposition elements are disciplined, tolerant towards those they differ from and accommodative of each other could win them the moral upper ground in the eyes of the public. Only in form and style, they can show how different they are from the ruling coalition.

The opposition camp should stir the path in signifying that the electoral platform is not designed to wage bitter and resentful political battles. They can show that it is a mechanism for a contest for power whereby all have the means to be heard, and get voted into office. It may be hard, and certainly depend a lot on how the incumbent behaves. Nevertheless, it should not be impossible for the opposition to claim the moral high ground in the eyes of the electorate.

For the various opposition elements to have the discipline to cooperate on grounds of mutual interests is in their best interest.

Like the incumbent, they too have suffered a bruise in a form of credibility deficit from the outcomes of the previous election. It is much harder for the opposition to galvanize their supporters and the larger electorate now that many voters have come to be sceptical with what was once an appealing promise - that a regime change is an antecedent for transformative change of nations.

That oppositions' victories are no guarantees of better management than incumbents has been seen in many places such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ghana. If crowned to a state house, the opposition is capable of being as equally corrupt, inefficient, authoritative and disrespectful of the rule of law.

Electorates in Ethiopia have come to appreciate this, following the debacle of leaders' of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) in the aftermath of the election and their subsequent disintegration after they were released from jail. The brutality and viciousness with which they have treated one another in dealing with their differences and break up has alarmed many. So much so that observers fear they might be no different from their political archrivals when assuming offices up in Arat Kilo.

The internal squabble between the rank and file on the one hand; and the leadership of the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) - an opposition party which claims to be the progeny of the CUD - reinforced this uneasiness. It did help little in comforting the sceptical electorate that given the chance of winning the election, the opposition would do a better job than the ruling EPRDF.

The opposition parties would do better to work together (in whatever format they choose to) in order to dispel such growing uncertainly mounting among even their diehard supporters. It is when they bring order to their own respective camps that they can reclaim confidence. The mood among the electorate may change in the subsequent few months and electoral emotions may boil up once again; and the flood of popular discontent may surprise all as it did in the past.

Nonetheless, the overwhelming view among many voters today appears to be not to disturb the status quo that provided collective security and stability. It would be an unfortunate disservice if the opposition bloc is viewed either as irrelevant in this context or source of pre and post electoral violence.