At about the same time next year, Ethiopia will be up for yet another national episode - elections. That is, of course, if the embattled electoral board stick to its schedule and Parliament do not endorse any change on the timetable. And there is no reason to believe now that there will be any intention either from the incumbent or from its political rivals to postpone the elections from May 2010.

But the upcoming national elections will be characterized by three mutually reinforcing factors: Unpredictability, uncertainty, and insecurity. All could mean different things to various actors in the political landscape whose vested interest is in the way national elections are run and managed.

Ethiopia’s landscape has always been a political one, taking its subjects and observers alike by surprise. History is a good reminder of this fact.

Who would have thought that the second largest army in Africa would have fallen in a manner it did in the early 1990s due to a movement spearheaded by a dozen students who took up arms in the mid 1970s? Who would have thought that the two main allies in the insurgency against the Derg regime (EPLF in Eritrea and EPRDF in Ethiopia) would enter into a bloody border feud in the late 1990s that turned out to be a deadlock of eternity? Who would have imagined that the senior partner in the ruling coalition of Ethiopia, the TPLF, would be rocked from its core in the aftermath of the war with Eritrea, a process that has led to the dismissal of it most revered leaders? Who would have believed that a loose coalition stitched by unlikely bedfellows only eight months prior to the 2005 national elections would have left such a profound legacy on contemporary Ethiopian politics?

These are some main developments that have caused vigorous changes in the struggle for political power, and in which forces allied themselves in Ethiopia over the past 40 years. And it is bound to continue.

The political landscape entertains groups centred within the hemisphere of the incumbent - a.k.a the Revolutionary Democratic bloc; political forces that believe in non-violent political discourse, in spite of all its pitfalls; and groups that are determined to employ insurgency and armed response in order to advance their agenda, whether it is a self proclaimed separate national identity or a place of their claim within the Ethiopian political community.

If there is anything all these groups share in common, it is their desire to bring change of their own sort. The debate in Ethiopia today is not whether there is a need for change, but it is the kind and the pace of change that ought to be coming. Those in the Revolutionary Democratic camp are seen as enthusiastic as those in the opposition bloc of different sizes and shapes.

The Revolutionary Democrats have come thus far with the power of energy and force that were transformational indeed. They dismantled the century old centralist government and replaced it with a federalist arrangement based on linguistic-cultural identity; the authenticity of its practice is, nevertheless, disputable. Although remaining in a strong grip of democratic centralism parties with leftist background, such as that the Revolutionary Democrats exercise, they have nonetheless introduced power decentralization that, in turn, led to devolution of resources to as low as the woreda level.

Under their rule, the economy has expanded and registered consecutive years of growth; to be fair, no other government has achieved this milestone in the past. The civil service has been engulfed by a tsunami of reforms, although the intent and purpose of these reforms are perceived differently both by the givers, receivers and the spectator public.

Politically, there has always been a moderate space and room for dissent, whether the expression is in the form of opposition politics, or the existence of privately owned media platforms. There are institutions to administer these, such as Parliament, the judiciary and the electoral agency. But to what degree they operate free from the influence of the incumbent is understandably questionable.

Nonetheless, should the Revolutionary Democrats claim credit for all these monumental changes, which of course includes their historical role in the overthrow of the military junta, it ought to be deservingly right.

However, these are changes that have brought them thus far. They have now reached a crucial point where either they have to embrace change and decide to be its agent, or remain resistant to any reform from within, hence enter into a phase whose result is obviously clear, judging from history.

They could become an agent of change both in form and substance. Interestingly, such debate exists within themselves, telling from the nature of the recent meeting by members of the Executive Committee of the EPRDF.

In terms of form, whether or not their leader, Meles Zenawi, should remain head of the executive branch should they win the coming election is being debated among Revolutionary Democrats. There are those in favour of his wishes not to run for office, as there are many are those who feel insecure about his departure from Menelik’s Palace after almost 19 years of residence. For any keen observer of the incumbent, the recent election of Executive Committee members for the TPLF, held in Mekelle, signals the swinging mood; perhaps for the first, the incumbent leader of the party, Meles Zenawi, received almost an equal number of votes as Arkebe Oqubay from the rank and file of the TPLF. 

Those in favour of his departure see it as a symbolic change that perhaps for the first time, a powerful leader of this country would peacefully relegate his executive power to become an ordinary citizen. They see it as an attempt and a start for a managed change within a framework, before the nation gets ready for more spectacular changes crossing party lines and that will be peaceful and free from turmoil.

More substantively, there are those in the ruling party who would like to see him take a break for a while before he gets back into business. This time around, they would want to see him dedicate his focus and energy to reforming the party so that the EPRDF prepares to face the new realities. That, in practice, could mean reforming the party’s organization from a front to a national political party. Meles has indeed contemplated this idea at the beginning of this decade, right after he emerged as the undisputed leader of the ruling party back in 2000.

This is a kind of change and internal reform that causes insecurity in a significant number of politicians within the ruling party. They are afraid that an EPRDF as a national party would have no space for group representation, and that they will only become individual members. They fear this in effect neutralizes all the sacrifices made during the struggle against the Derg, with the platform of rights for nations and nationalities.

The insecurity level actually gets high when his departure from the executive power is added to the issue of continuity.

Those who would like Meles to stay in office argue on two accounts: It is time for the party and the country to benefit from his wealth of experience in leadership of such a turbulent country for the past 18 years. It is also a wrong time for him to leave now before the things that he has accomplished over the past 10 years are deepened enough. They believe one more term in office could help him and their party achieve a record on the economic front that is as irreversible as is the case with the political side.

Although over bulged in its membership size from enlisting close to four million cadres, the ruling party and its members are entering yet another phase of the national episode with these uncertainties on their leader’s role and insecurities due to their own place in the political discourse of the future.

Whatever is going on within them, how they will behave in the run up, during and in the aftermath of the coming election will determine the course this country will be taking in the years to come, for elections are platforms in embracing changes of a peaceful and non-violent nature.

Whether there will be lively and highly contested national elections in May 2010 as seen last is everyone’s guess. Whether or not the opposition bloc is prepared to enter into an electoral coalition and will be able to demonstrate a remarkable electoral challenge is too early to tell. It is clear, however, that the Revolutionary Democrats will not be as over confident as they had been in 2005. They may not probably take things for granted; and they may also be determined not to show a sign of complacence, for some of them believe over-confidence and complacence cost them dearly during the last elections.

Complacent, determined, weak or strong, it should be expected from a political party to fight arms and leg for an electoral victory. That is the whole point of creating a political system that allows a regular conduct of elections to get the voluntary and unforced expression of the voting public. It is a system designed so that the most unlikely candidates, as well as reformist groups, can aspire for a place in political leadership without the need to demonstrate brute force and revolutionary credential.

It is up to the incumbent, its leaders and the rank and file to set an example in playing by the rule; as well as show respect to the institutions that are created to enforce these rules. The rules apply as much to them as any of the other parties in the electoral contest.

Displaying such kind of discipline ought to help this country witness peaceful, free and fair elections. Should the Revolutionary Democrats continue to rule, this will be the source of their legitimacy. Should they lose, not only will they leave a great legacy behind, but also ensure certainty and guarantee security of the party and individual members to have a place in whatever change could probably come.